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I. INTRODUCTION
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (here-
inafter ICSID) was created in 1966 as a forum for settling contract dis-
putes involving a foreign investor and a host state government.' The
number of agreements of this nature has increased during the past sev-
eral years, especially as foreign investment has increased in less-devel-
oped countries (LDCs) or in newly industrialized countries (NICs). IC-
SID utilizes arbitration and conciliation in settling these disputes and
thereby provides an effective alternative to local court proceedings in
those countries that have become ICSID signatories.' Likewise, the
availability of this agency's services represents an important tool for en-
couraging foreign investment in LDCs. While more than 90 nations have
Pecome signatories of ICSID, very few Latin American countries are sig-
patories.' As a result, many Latin American countries, which could
greatly benefit from foreign investment, do not avail themselves of IC-
SID's services which substantially encourage foreign investment. A pri-
mary reason for their reluctance to join ICSID may be attribeted to the
Wvidespread adoption of the Calvo doctrine of law and the inclusion of
"Calvo clauses"" in most Latin American investment contra~ts. Briefly
qtated the Calvo doctrine requires that legal disputes involving foreigners
doing business in a country which recognizes this doctrine be resolved by
local remedies rather than by international legal remedies. Although the
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1. Convention on the Settlement of investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090,
575 U.N.T.S. 159, (entered into force Oct. 14, 1966), reprinted in 4 T.L.M. 532 (1965)
[hereinafter ICSID Convention].
2. Id.
3. Disputes before the Centre, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVEST-
MENT DISPUTES, TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 6-7 (1988) [hereinafter ICSID. 21ST
ANN. REP.]; see also Amerasinghe, The International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes and Development Through the Multinational Corporation, 9 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 793, 798 (1976).
4. Infra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
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creators of ICSID advocated the application of international legal reme-
dies, they also saw certain attributes associated with the Calvo doctrine.
This recognition lead to the incorporation of a modified version of the
Latin American Calvo clause into Article 27 of the Convention on Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States [hereinafter "ICSID Convention"], the convention that estab-
lished ICSID.5
This Article begins with a discussion of ICSID, examining its creation,
jurisdiction, operations, and problems. This discussion is followed by an
in-depth examination of the Calvo doctrine and Calvo clauses, tracing
their development and scope of applicability. Finally, the legal interac-
tion between Calvo clauses and ICSID provisions is examined in an at-
tempt to identify the conflicting concepts and to make recommendations
for effectively reconciling them.
II. THE GENESIS OF ICSID
The globalization of business operations and the need to finance for-
eign direct investment in plant and equipment have resulted in a large
flow of funds across national borders. Most international business ven-
tures involve contractual agreements between foreign investors and local
individuals, business firms, or financial institutions. In most of these ven-
tures, the parties involved are private business firms or individuals.'
Investment disputes often arise in these contractual relationships. Be-
cause most of the disputes occur between private parties, they are settled
by a variety of traditional means, ranging from court proceedings to ami-
cable settlements. A private dispute settlement organization, the most
prominent of which are the American Arbitration Association, Japan
Arbitration Association, Korean Arbitration Association, and the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce, is often utilized to settle the dispute.
A narrow but growing area of foreign investment disputes involves
contracts between foreign private investors and host state governments.
The number of agreements of this nature has been increasing during the
past several years, especially as foreign investment has increased in
LDCs or in NICsZ
ICSID was created as a result of the international community's con-
cern that "the inadequacy of arrangements for dealing with investment
5. ICSID Convention, supra note I, at art. 27.
6. Amerasinghe, supra note 3, at 793-95; see also Baker & Yoder, ICSID Arbitration
and the U.S. Multinational Corporation, 5 J. INT'L ARB. 81, 81 (1988).
7. Delaume, ICSID Arbitration and the Courts, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 784, 790-91 (1983).
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disputes between developing countries and foreign investors has been a
long-standing impediment to the flow of private capital into the develop-.
ing countries. . . ." Historically, the settlement of these disputes has
been fraught with difficulties, the most significant of which is the inabil-
ity of the investor to control court access. An investor seeking redress
from the host government is at the mercy of that government.9 An inves-
tor may resort to local remedies, the availability of which is determined
by the host government. If local remedies are unayailable, the investor
may seek protection from his own government if it will entertain the
claim. The resolution of these disputes, in either domestic or interna-
tional courts, however, depends upon the host government's willingness
to submit to a court's jurisdiction. Accordingly, the investor has little
guarantee of court access.10
Even if access to a court can be obtained, several obstacles to consis-
tent adjudication remain. First, traditional conflict of laws problems,
both procedural and substantive, must be addressed."' Also, the different
legal systems used by various countries may create contrary results in a
given case.12 The differences, for example, between English common law
and Napoleonic civil law are quite significant. While the common law
system is a precedent-oriented legal system utilizing development of legal
concepts through a logical progression of cases, the civil law system re-
lies heavily on statutes with less emphasis on cases and little use of pre-
cedent. Another potential obstacle to consistent adjudication is the so-
phistication of the adjudicator, whether a judge, a jury, or both. Because
investment cases often involve complex commercial contracts, an inaccu-
rate or even inconsistent 'finding of fact or application of law may result
if the adjudicator is not a specialist in the disputed subject matter.13 Ad-
ditionally, the investor may risk prejudice if local courts are utilized.1'
Finally, the parties must weigh the traditional problems of court conges-
tion and delay in deciding whether to utilize the courts. Because of the
foregoing factors, the results of adjudicating the same dispute may vary
from country to country. Thus, national courts are not always an appro-
priate dispute resolution alternative.
8. Boskey & Sella, Settling Investment Disputes, 2 FUND & BANK REv.-FIN. & DEV.
129 (1965).
9. Amerasinghe, supra note 3, at 795.
10. Id.
11. Chong Su Yun, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes - Com-
mentary and Forecast, II MALAYA L. REv. 287, 289 (1969).
12. Id. at 289; see also infra note 12, at 9-10.
13. Supra note 11, at 289.
14. id.
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For many years, organizations such as the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation have been settling investment disputes between private parties by
using arbitration and conciliation. Difficulties in settling commercial dis-
putes by arbitration associations have been identified,1 5 however, and
even the International Court of Justice has not had a particularly out-
standing record in handling complex commercial disputes."6
Furthermore, arbitration procedures have not been widely adopted by
nations in the Western Hemisphere because of concerns regarding the
enforceability of arbitral awards.17 For example, while the Montevideo
Treaty of International Procedural Law of 1888 included a statement
that gave "the same force to judgments or decisions by arbitration in the
territory of others that they have in the issuing country,"1 this treaty
was ratified in only four countries. 9 After World War I, the League of
Nations and the International Chamber of Commerce worked together
to foster an international effort culminating with two additional multilat-
eral treaties dealing with arbitration, the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration
Clauses of 1923 and the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign
Awards of 1927.20 The Seventh International Conference of American
States adopted a resolution to create a multinational agency for the es-
tablishment of an inter-American system of arbitration.2 This resolution
led to the development of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration
Commission (IACAC) in 1934 under the guidance of the American Ar-
bitration Association.12 The inability of IACAC to enforce its decisions,
however, has been a major impediment to the Commission's
development.2
In order to overcome the inadequate enforcement of these treaties, es-
pecially the Geneva Convention, the International Chamber of Com-
merce and the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
took measures which ultimately resulted in the United Nations Confer-
ence on International Commercial Arbitration in New York in 1958.
15. Nussbaum, The Arbitration Between The Lena Goldfields, LTL. and the Soviet
Government, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 31 (1950).
16. Spofford, Third Party Judgment and International Economic Transactions, 113
RlcuIEI. DEs COuRS 117, 149-50 (No. 111, 1964).
17. Szasz, Arbitration Under the Auspices of the World Bank, 3 INT'L LAw 312, 315
(1969).
18. International Arbitration, 14 WORLD Bus. 9, 10 (1969).
19. Id.
20. Richard, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Under the United National Con-
vention of 1958: A Survey of Recent Federal Case Law, II MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 13,
14-15 (1987).
21. Supra note 18.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 10-11.
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This conference adopted the Convention on Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 (hereinafter the New York
Convention of 1958), which represented a major improvement in interna-
tional commercial arbitration. Subsequent to the framing of this conven-
tion, Latin American nations, through the Inter-American Juridical
Committee, prepared a draft convention on International Commercial
Arbitration in 1967. Further work on this draft culminated in 1975 with
the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration
at the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private International
Law in Panama. This Convention (hereinafter the Inter-American Con-
vention of 1975) adopted and combined parts of both the Juridical Com-
mittee's 1967 Draft Convention and the New York Convention of
1958.24 These conventions cover both the enforcement of the arbitral
agreement and the arbitral award itself.
Both Conventions, particularly the New York Convention of 1958, re-
quire that disputes should be submitted to arbitration rather than to the
courts. In addition, once any award is made, it is enforceable by the
courts of the countries which have adopted these Conventions. As of No-
vember 1988, 79 countries had ratified or acceded to the New York Con-
vention,25 while as of 1985, nine had ratified the Inter-American Con-
vention.2" Sixteen countries have ratified one but not the other of the
Conventions27 and eight countries have ratified neither.28 These eight
countries are Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Bolivia, Canada, tle Domini-
can Republic, Jamaica, and Nicaragua. 9 The United States qnally rati-
fied the New York Convention of 1958 in 1970 and, since that time,
several cases have implemented the Convention provisions to enforce ar-
bitral agreements and awards.2" The shortcoming of these Conventions,
however, is that they do not apply to arbitration of disputes where one of
the parties is a state government.
III. ICSID
In light of these drawbacks to foreign investment dispute settlement,
as well as the need for encouraging foreign investment in LDCs, the
24. Nattier, International Commercial Arbitration in Latin America: Enforcement of
Arbitral Agreements and Awards, 21 TEx. INT'L L.J. 397, 402-05 (1986).
25. See Membership, ICSID, 21ST ANN. REP. 6 (1988).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Supra note 24, at 405; NEws FROM ICSID, Winter 1989, at 7.
30. Supra note 20, at 15.
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Board of Governors of the World Bank initiated a study in 1962 to de-
termine the feasibility of establishing an institution designed to facilitate
the settlement of international disputes through conciliation or arbitra-
tion. It was believed that such an agency could foster increased interna-
tional investment for development projects."
ICSID was subsequently created by the Convention on the Settlement
of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States
(Convention), which was submitted for country member ratification in
March 1965, and which became effective in October 1966. Signatory
members of ICSID are required to be members of the World Bank. As
of March 3, 1989, a total of 97 World Bank member nations had signed
the Convention and 91 of these had deposited ratified instruments with
ICSID.3 2 The most recent signatories were Belize, Hungary, and Tur-
key. 3 Table 1 provides a list of current ICSID members.
31. Report of the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of Other States, reprinted in 4 I.L.M. 524, 112 (1965) [hereinafter Report
of the Executive Directors].
32. Annual Meeting of the Administrative Council of the International Centre for Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes, TWENTY-FIRST PROCEEDINGS OF THE ICSID ADMINIS-
TRATIVE COUNCIL 1 (1988) [hereinafter Annual Meeting, 21sT PRO. OF ICSID ADMIN.
COUN.]; NEWS FROM ICSID, Winter 1989, at 2.
33. Membership, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES,
TWENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1987) [hereinafter ICSID, 20TH ANN. REP.].
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TABLE 134
List of Contracting States and Convention Signatories
(*States which have ratified the Convention but which have not yet
deposited instruments of ratification)
Afghanistan
Australia*
Austria
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belgium
Belize*
Benin, Peoples' Republic of
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo, People's Republic of the
Costa Rica*
Cote d'Ivoire
Cyprus
Denmark
Ecuador
Luxembourg
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Morocco
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Philippines
Portugal
Romania
Rwanda
34. List of Contracting States and Signatories of the Convention (as of June 30, 1988),
ICSID. 21sT ANN. REP. 6 (1988) [hereinafter Contracting States]; NEWS FROM ICSID,
Winter 1989, at 2. The following is a regional breakdown of contracting states:
Africa - People's Republic of Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cen-
tral African Republic, Chad, Comoros, People's Republic of the Congo, Cote d'Ivorie, Ga-
bon, The Gambia, Chana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra, Le-
one, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia;
Asia - Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Japan, Republic of Korea, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka;
Western Europe - Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;
Eastern Europe - Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia;
Southern Pacific - Fiji, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philip-
pines, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Western Samoa;
North America - United States of America;
Central America & Caribbean - Barbados, El Salvador, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad
and Tobago;
South America - Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay; and
Middle East - Arab Republic of Egypt, Cyprus, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,
United Arab Emirates.
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Egypt, Arab Republic of
El Salvador
Ethiopia*
Fiji
Finland
France
Gabon
Gambia, The
Germany, Federal Republic of
Ghana
Greece
Guinea
Guyana
Haiti*
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
Indonesia
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kenya
Korea, Republic of
Kuwait
Lesotho
Liberia
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Solomon Islands
Somalia
Sri Lanka
St. Lucia
Sudan
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Thailand*
Togo
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom of
Great Britan and
Northern Ireland
United States of
America
Western Samoa
Yugoslavia
Zaire
Zambia
A. ICSID Procedures
ICSID facilitates the arbitration or conciliation 35 of investment dis-
putes between foreign investors from states that are ICSID Convention
signatories and host state governments that are also Convention signato-
ries. If such a dispute arises and the parties agree to submit to ICSID's
35. Boskey & Sella, supra note 8, at 133. In conciliation, as the term is used for ICSID
purposes, a commission of conciliators listens to the parties, clarifies issues, encourages
agreement between the paties, and renders nonbinding recommendations. In arbitration, an
arbitral tribunal hears the dispute and makes a binding, legally enforceable decision.
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jurisdiction, both parties are required to accept the award granted by the
ICSID process.31
The process begins with the formation of either an arbitration panel or
a conciliation committee, each consisting of at least three members.3 7
After deciding whether to form an arbitration panel or a conciliation
committee, depending on the facts of the case, each party to the dispute
may choose one name from a list of individuals compiled and maintained
by ICSID. The individuals on the list are prominent in business or are
legal experts on negotiation. A third arbitrator (known as the President
of the Tribunal) or conciliator (known as the Chairman of the Commis-
sion) is appointed with the agreement of the parties or by the two party-
selected arbitrators. ICSID then facilitates the process by arranging
meetings and travel for these panels or committees. The panel members
examine the evidence in their assigned case and decide upon an award to
one of the parties in an arbitration proceeding. 8 If the dispute is
presented to a conciliation committee, the committee merely makes a
-ecommendation to the parties. 9
In practice, the individuals who serve on ICSID arbitration panels or
conciliation committees are generally lawyers who specialize in interna-
lional law and who usually have a different nationality than the parties
involved in the dispute."' Many panelists have occupied prominent posi-
tions in their respective governments at the time of, or prior to, their
.appointment. One panelist was a former judge of the International Court
of Justice and several have been distinguished law professors.
In almost all cases, arbitrators and conciliators selected by both the
claimants and the defendants have been nationals of industrialized coun-
tries. The 67 appointees to ICSID arbitration and conciliation'cases have
represented the major geographical regions of the world, including most
legal systems. Table 2 details the geographical origin of the ICSID arbi-
trators and conciliators. 1
36. Report of Executive Directors, supra note 31, at 32.
37. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, at art. 37.
38. Id. at art. 48.
39. See INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, NINE-
TEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 8-9 (1986); Introduction by the Secretary-General, ICSID, 20TH
ANN. REP. 4-5 (1987).
40. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, at art. 13.
41. NEws FROM ICSID, Spring 1987, at 7; NEws FROM ICSID, Winter 1989, at 3.
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TABLE 2
Geographical Origin of ICSID Arbitrators
Europe
Austria
Belgium
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
FR Germany
France
Great Britain
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Total
Africa
Madagascar
Egypt
Senegal
Sudan
Total
North America
Canada
USA
Total
Latin American and the
Caribbean
Jamaica
Mexico
Uruguay
Total
Asia
Iran
Philippines
Thailand
Total
B. Jurisdiction
In order for the Convention to be ratified by Contracting States, the
question of jurisdiction had to be narrowly defined. A narrow definition
of jurisdiction is critical, because the Convention is designed to fill a par-
ticular gap in the available facilities for settling investment disputes.
Therefore, jurisdiction is initially limited to legal disputes arising out of
an investment.4 2 Mere differences of opinion or conflicts of interest are
outside the jurisdiction of ICSID.4 3 Jurisdiction is further limited to the
settlement of investment disputes between a Contracting State, i.e., a
42. ICSID Convention, supra note I, at art. 25(1).
43. Id.
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country which had ratified the Convention, and a national of another
Contracting State. 4 The national of another Contracting State can be
an individual, a group of individuals in concert, or a firm. Moreover,
ICSID specifically lacks jurisdiction when an investment dispute involves
two Contracting States, which instead are required to use the Interna-
tional Court of Justice or the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
ICSID performs other services in addition to the facilitation of arbi-
tration or conciliation of investment disputes. For example, it makes
available model clauses formulated for insertion into contracts between
foreign investors and Contracting State governments.45 These model
clauses include both (1) bilateral investment contract provisions for dis-
pute submission to ICSID and (2) provisions which might be included in
bilateral treaties designed to encourage investments by one party in the
territory of another." ICSID also compiles investment laws from more
than 55 developing nations.47 These compilations have been published in
looseleaf form and consist of constitutional, legislative, regulatory, and
treaty materials that deal with agreements affecting foreign invest-
ment.4 8 ICSID has thus developed into an important source of systematic
information on foreign investment law.
In addition, ICSID promotes bilateral treaties between signatory
states. Examples of this service were the treaties negotiated between In-
donesia and Belgium, between Indonesia and France, and between Tuni-
sia and France, which were all designed to be bilateral treaties for the
protection and promotion of foreign investment between the parties to
each treaty.49 In addition, ICSID encourages host countries to formulate
foreign investment laws that initiate ICSID jurisdiction in foreign invest-
Ment disputes eligible for the ICSID process. This encouragemnt is nec-
essary because the Convention does not bind signatory parties to dispute
settlement by ICSID's procedures. The parties, although Convention sig-
natories, may limit cases heard by ICSID or even decline to submit to
ICSID's jurisdiction altogether. 50
The most recent addition to ICSID's various services focuses on the
education and dissemination of foreign investment literature. ICSID pro-
motes conferences and colloquia on international arbitration and pub-
44. Id.
45. See INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, FOURTH
ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1971).
46. NEws FROM ICSID, Winter 1987, at 6.
47. Id.
48. INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, SEVENTH AN-
NUAL REPORT 5 (1974).
49. Id.
50. ICSID: What it is, What it does. How it works, ICSID Brochure, July 1, 1968.
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lishes a journal, entitled ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law, which
is the first periodical devoted to foreign investment law.51
According to the Winter 1989 issue of News from ICSID, twenty-six
cases have been submitted for arbitration or conciliation since the estab-
lishment of ICSID in 1966. More than half of these cases have been
submitted since 1981, and all but one of the twenty-six case requests
were submitted by investors5 2 Ten cases are still pending in arbitration,
conciliation, or annulment proceedings.5 3 The procedures outlined in Ar-
ticle 52 of the Convention state that either party may request an annul-
ment of any part or all of the award. Of the ten arbitral awards granted
by ICSID, only two have been annulled.5'
Despite the fact that ICSID encourages the flow of foreign direct in-
vestment to LDCs, it remains a rather obscure international agency. Past
studies have found that top executives in U.S. multinational companies
(MNCs), including vice-presidents of international operations, chief fi-
nancial officers, and international legal counsel, are not very familiar
with ICSID and its facilities.55 These studies have also found that the
same MNCs seldom utilize ICSID services.5"
IV. LACK OF FAMILIARIZATION OR UTILIZATION OF ICSID
The lack of familiarity with and utility of ICSID services by U.S.
MNCs is a result of several reasons. First, jurisdiction represents a prob-
lem. ICSID's narrow jurisdictional scope limits its usefulness because
most international business contract disputes arise between private for-
eign investors and private individuals or companies located in the host
state. These disputes are handled by other means, as previously discussed
in this Article. 7 On the other hand, foreign direct investment has been
increasing at a rapid rate during the past several years, and it might be
inferred that this growth has led to the consummation of an increasing
number of foreign direct investment projects involving contracts between
private foreign investors and host state governments. For example, Baker
and Ryans conducted research and concluded that many petroleum com-
panies are required to operate in this manner, and it was these compa-
51. Publications, ICSID, 21ST ANN. REP. 10 (1988).
52. Introduction by the Secretary-General, ICSID, 21ST ANN. REP. 4 (1988).
53. Disputes before the Centre, id. at 6-7; Naws FRoM ICSID, Winter 1989, at 2.
54. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, at art. 52.
55. Baker & Ryans, A Solution to Foreign Contract Investment Disputes, 10 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 65, 71 (1976); Baker, ICSID: An International Method for Handling Foreign
Investment Disputes in LDC's, FOREIGN TRADE REv. 411, 411-21 (Jan.-Mar. 1987).
56. Id.
57. Id.
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nies that were found by Baker and Ryans to be the most familiar with
ICSID.58
Many respondents in the studies by Baker and Ryans59 and by Baker 0
cited the paucity of case materials as a second reason for their lack of
familiarity with or utilization of ICSID. U.S. MNC officials' own confu-
sion after their evaluation of ICSID may be attributed to the small num-
ber of cases decided by the ICSID procedures.6 ' None of the chief finan-
cial officers of U.S. MNCs responding to the Baker study believed the
Convention favors the foreign investor,62 even though the few awards
made have been in favor of the foreign investor.6 3 The problem of lack of
case materials is perpetuated by the inability of ICSID to publish case
results without the consent of both parties. 4 ICSID would like to begin
publishing case results in the next edition of its publication, ICSID
Cases.6 5 The parties to settled disputes, however, have not had the oppor-
tunity to consent to such publication,"6 and their consent is required
before publication, even though dissemination of case results would be
worthwhile to investors planning projects in LDCs.
A third problem, often cited by international dispute settlerhent orga-
nizations, is the lack of enforcement of ICSID rules, regulations, and
findings. 67 In one case, for instance, the contracting host state govern-
ment has declined to pay its full share of the expenses of th proceed-
ing.68 In addition, this state has not complied with the award rendered.69
Identification of this state has not been made public pursuant to ICSID
procedures.70 If this nonadherence to rules, regulations, and awards is
allowed to continue, both the state government which fails to cpmply and
tpe entire ICSID arbitration procedure will lose credibility.
Investors who are considering using ICSID's facilities are also con-
cerned about the ease with which a party may withdraw from an ICSID
58. Baker & Ryans, ICSID, A Little Known Solution to Investment Disputes in High
Risk Countries, 6 AKRON Bus. & EcON. REV. 8, 12 (Fall 1975).
59. Baker & Ryans, supra note 55, at 71.
60. Baker, supra note 55, at 411-21.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 411-21.
64. Annual Meeting, 21sT PRO. OF ICSID ADMIN. COUN., supra note 32, at
Attachment.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Szasz, supra note 17.
68. Annual Meeting, 21sT PRO. OF ICSID ADMIN. COUN., supra note 32, at
Attachment.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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proceeding already in progress.7 1 In the case of ICSID, the Convention
requires that both parties to an arbitration panel or conciliation commit-
tee proceeding accept ICSID jurisdiction.72 In 1977, three cases were
submitted to ICSID by aluminum producers with contract disputes in-
volving the Government of Jamaica."3 Although the parties in these dis-
putes had agreed to accept the jurisdiction of ICSID, Jamaica later uni-
laterally withdrew from the proceedings after it announced its
participation in the establishment of an international bauxite cartel."'
Technically, the proceedings were discontinued at the request of the for-
eign investor claimants after an agreement was reached with the respon-
dent which provided a basis for final settlement.75 Ultimately, the ability
of a contracting host state government to withdraw from ICSID proceed-
ings in this manner will reduce the credibility of ICSID's procedures and
facilities.
The fourth reason for the lack of ICSID familiarity, as identified by
respondents to both the Baker and Ryans studies and the Baker study,"'
is the lack of adequate information concerning ICSID's operations.7 7
Only eleven percent of the chief financial officers in the Baker study be-
lieved they had been provided adequate information about the Conven-
tion and/or ICSID.7 8 A similar finding was reported in the Baker &
Ryans study in which seventeen of the thirty-five firms who in fact have
one or more corporate-host government agreements felt they had ade-
quate information about ICSID.79 In contrast, various articles on differ-
ent aspects of ICSID have appeared in several law journals."0 ICSID
71. Annual Meeting, 21sT PRO. OF ICSID ADMIN. COUN., supra note 32.
72. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, at art. 25(l).
73. For an indepth analysis of this case, see Schmidt, Arbitration Under the Auspices of
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID); Implications of
the Decision on Jurisdiction in Alcoa Minerals of Jamaica, Inc. v. Government of Ja-
maica, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 90 (1976).
74. Kaiser Bauxite Company v. Government of Jamaica, Case ARB/74/3; Reynolds
Jamaica Mines, Ltd. and Reynolds Metals Company v. Government of Jamaica, Case
ARB/74/4.
75. Id.
76. Baker & Ryans, supra note 55, at 71.
77. Id. at 75.
78. Baker, supra note 55, at 419.
79. Baker & Ryans, supra note 55, at 73-75.
80. See generally Boskey & Sella, Settling Investment Disputes, 2 FIN. & DEv. 129-34
(1965); Broches, Awards Rendered Pursuant to the ICSID Convention: Binding Force,
Finality, Recognition, Enforcement, Execution, 2 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 287-334
(1987); Broches, Development of International Law by the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, PROCEEDINGS OF AsIL 33-38 (1965); Broches, Settling Inter-
national Investment Disputes, 119 THE BANKER No. 516, 140-46 (1969); Delaume, Con-
vention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, I INT'L LAW. 46-80 (Oct. 1966); Fiedland, Provisional Measures and ICSID Arbi-
tration, 2 ARB. INT'L 335-57 (1986); Hynning, The World Bank's Plan for the Settlement
[Vol. 5:1 19891
ICSID: CALVO CLAUSE
itself issues a number of publications, including a semiannual newsletter
(News from ICSID), a journal (ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law
Journal), an annual report, a report of the annual meeting of the ICSID
Administrative Council, a monograph entitled ICSID Cases: 1972-1987,
which is periodically revised, and miscellaneous pamphlets. Thus, it ap-
pears that few international organizations have received more analyses
and publicity than ICSID.
A final problem, and the focus of this Article, is that membership in
ICSID has been cited as a deterrent to its utilization. Before 1979, IC-
SID's membership showed limited geographic diversification, especially
since the Arab World and Latin America were absent."' Since 1979, Ku-
wait, Saudia Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates have signed the
Convention."' However, Latin America remains a problem. Although
Belize became the twelfth ICSID member country from Latin America
during fiscal 1987, Latin American countries represent only a handful of
Caribbean and Central American nations as Convention signatories, and
only two South American countries, Ecuador and Paraguay, have be-
come ICSID members. 3 Until more nations become signatories of the
Convention, ICSID will remain quite ineffective in Latin America. 4
A major problem, especially in Latin America, in the development of
the use of ICSID, or any other type of international arbitration, stems
from the widespread adoption of the Calvo doctrine of law by Latin
American nations. 5 Latin American investment contracts gererally con-
lain a "Calvo clause," which follows the Calvo doctrine8 requiring ex-
liaustion of local legal remedies for resolving contract disputes before a
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Development Agreements, I J. INT'L ARB. 145 (1984); Redfern, ICSID - Losing its Ap-
peal? 3 ARB. INT'L 98-118 (1987); Rodley, Some Aspects of the World Bank Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 4 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 43-63 (1966); Sassoon,
The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States, I ISRAEL L.R. No. 1, 27-39 (1966); Sirefman, The World Bank Plan for
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81. Contracting States, supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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foreign investor can resort to his own court system or to an international
agency.87 The adoption of ICSID procedures in Latin American coun-
tries has developed very slowly, and will continue to develop slowly so
long as the Calvo doctrine continues to be a part of their dispute resolu-
tion practices.
V. THE CALVO DOCTRINE AND CALVO CLAUSES
During the 1800's, Latin American countries experienced diplomatic
and military intervention by foreign investors which ultimately created
the protectionist attitudes toward international law that Latin American
countries possess today.88 Of particular disdain to these countries were
the abuses that occured as a result of protection measures afforded aliens
under international law.88 In an effort to eliminate diplomatic protection
of foreign citizens in Latin American countries, and to replace this pro-
tection with equal legal treatment of both nationals and aliens in a state,
many Latin American countries adopted the Calvo doctrine of law,
named for the Argentinian diplomat and jurist, Carlos Calvo.90 The view
that "it is certain that aliens who establish themselves in a country have
the same rights to protection as nationals, but they ought not to lay
claim to a protection more extended"91 was expressed in an 1896 treatise
by Calvo, who lived from 1824 to 1906. Calvo felt that recognition of the
international law concept would result in allowing "an exorbitant and
fatal privilege, especially favourable to the powerful states and injurious
to the weaker nations, establishing an unjustifiable inequality between
nationals and foreigners. ' 92 In addition, Calvo maintained that recogni-
tion of the international standard would contradict the fundamental con-
cept of territorial sovereignty championed by independent nations.93
Several international documents which recognize the Calvo doctrine
include the following:
1) the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation entered into by Latin American
States at the second Lima Congress (1864-65);
2) the First International Conference on American States (held in Wash-
ington, D.C. 1889-90); and
87. J. SIMPSON & H. Fox, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 118 n.17
(1959).
88. H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSITIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 522 (2d. ed. 1976).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. C. CALVO LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL THE ORIQUE ET PRACTIQUE 231 (5th ed.
1986).
92. Id.
93. Id. at vol. 3, 142.
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3) the Seventh Conference of American States (held in Montevideo in
1933).4
While the Calvo doctrine was aimed at preventing abuses from invoca-
tions of diplomatic protection, it did not prohibit all international claims
available to aliens.95 To fill this gap and to complement this doctrine, the
Calvo clause developed as part of many Latin American contracts. By
-including a Calvo clause in a contract, all chances of diplomatic inter-
vention are eliminated, and the alien is truly on an equal legal stance
with the national. Basically, by agreeing to include a Calvo clause in a
contract, the alien contracting party agrees to waive all rights to diplo-
matic protection afforded him by his own country under international
law. In the event of a contractual dispute, therefore, the alien con-
tracting party can resort only to the legal remedies available in the fo-
rum state.
The existence of a Calvo clause in a contract can take several forms. It
can exist as an express agreement in the contract, or it can be deemed to
be an implied contract term in those states which have included Calvo
clauses in their constitutions or statutes. 6 Articles 30 and 31 of the Ec-
uadorian law of February 16, 1938, are illustrations of such provisions:
Article 30. Contracts concluded between the Ecuadorian Government
and foreign persons, either individuals or firms of any kind, are subject to
the laws of Ecuador, and the rights and obligations deriving froni said con-
tracts will be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the national judges and
courts.
Article 31. The renunciation of diplomatic claims will be an implicit and
essential condition of all contracts concluded by foreigners with the state, or
of all contracts obligating the state or individuals to foreigners, or of all
contracts whose effects should be felt in Ecuador.97
Hence, in countries adopting the Calvo doctrine, it is possible to be sub-
ject to the ramifications of a Calvo clause in a contractual dispute even
where the contracting parties themselves did not expressly include such a
provision in their agreement.
A. Validity and Enforceability
The validity and enforceability of Calvo clauses in international trans-
actions has created much debate with conflicting results. Courts inter-
preting Calvo clauses have set out the general theme that each case in-
94. F. GARCIA-AMADOR. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 62 (1985).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 63.
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volving the application of a Calvo clause must be considered and decided
on its own merits. 8 In the landmark 1926 case of North American
Dredging Co. of Texas v. United Mexican States,99 decided by the
United States-Mexican Claims Commission, the Commission upheld the
validity of a Calvo clause contained in a contract between the Mexican
government and a United States corporation. 100 This decision, however,
did not make all Calvo clauses valid under all circumstances. The Com-
mission's decision in North American Dredging Co. reasoned that alter-
native international remedies will remain available to an alien because to
do otherwise would constitute a "denial of justice."''1 Subsequent deci-
sions by the Commission stated that to constitute a denial of justice, the
interest involved would have to be substantial and the conduct of the
state grave. 10 2 While many decisions have upheld Calvo clauses, other
decisions have held Calvo clauses to be an ineffective bar to alternative
international tribunals when the clause's language was too vague to de-
termine the intent of the contracting parties, and where the government
itself annulled the contract.' Although there have been no significant
international arbitrations involving the Calvo clause since the 1930's,
and although the significance of the Calvo doctrine has been minimized
as a result of the globalization of economies and the international recog-
nition of the equality of human rights, many Latin American countries
continue to follow the Calvo legal doctrine and to subject their invest-
ment contracts to these clauses.' 0 4 Hence, foreigners interested in enter-
ing into investment contracts in countries that utilize Calvo clauses must
weigh the effects this legal doctrine will have on their ability to enforce
such contracts.
B. ICSID and the Calvo Clause
It is apparent that so long as Latin American countries continue to
include Calvo clauses in their investment contracts, these countries will
not become ICSID signatories.10 5 The very purpose of ICSID, to provide
98. J. SIMPSON & H. Fox, supra note 87, at 118.
99. North American Dredging Co. of Texas v. United Mexican States, 4 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 21, 26 (1926).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. INTER-OCEANIC RAILWAY Co. ARBITRATION, 6 Annual Digest 199 (1931-32); El
Ero Mining And Railroad Co., 5 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 91 (1952).
103. J. SIMPSON & H. Fox, supra note 87, at 122.
104. For a survey of countries affected, see D. SHEA. THE CALVO CLAUSE, A PROBLEM OF
INTER-AMERICAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY 269-81 (1955).
105. Contracting States, supra note 34, at 14-15.
[Vol. 5:1 1989]
ICSID: CALVO CLAUSE
a neutral international dispute resolution vehicle for contracts involving
foreign investors and host state governments, is in direct conflict with
Calvo clauses, which disallow alternative international forums for resolv-
ing contract disputes with aliens. In countries that utilize Calvo clauses,
foreign investors can only pursue remedies of the host state govern-
ment.106 Foreign investors are not only reluctant to use local courts for
fear of prejudice and lack of control, but also because the likelihood of
being able to use ICSID or other types of international arbitration is
slim as a result of the Calvo doctrine prerequisites.
Generally, the effect of a Calvo clause "to deprive an international
tribunal of jurisdiction depends partly on the terms of the clause, partly
on the treaty establishing the tribunal, and partly on the basis upon
which the claim is presented to the tribunal."'17 The Calvo clause, how-
ever, has not been held void, although tribunals have tried to limit its
scope and effect.' 08 Ironically, ICSID itself recognizes the Calvo clause
concept by inclusion of a version of a Calvo clause in Article 27 of the
Convention of Investment Disputes which reads as follows:
(1) No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an inter-
national claim, in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and an-
other Contracting State shall have consented to submit or shall have sub-
mitted to arbitration under this Convention, unless such other Contracting
State shall have failed to abide by and comply with the award rendered in
such dispute.
(2) Diplomatic protection, for purposes of paragraph (1), shall not include
informal diplomatic exchanges for the sole purpose of facilitating a settle-
ment of the dispute.'
Inclusion of Article 27 in the Convention requires resolution of dis-
putes submitted to ICSID to be determined entirely by ICSID to the
exclusion of any other diplomatic protection otherwise available to the
contracting parties."' Consequently, the members of ICSID who submit
their contractual disputes for ICSID resolution waive all other rights to
diplomatic protection in their own state. Morever, because contracts with
Latin American countries also contain a Calvo clause restricting resolu-
tion of contractual disputes exclusively to the local remedies available in
the host state, and not to any international alternatives, the co-existence
of these two Calvo clauses are in direct conflict. Compliance with both
Calvo clauses by Latin American countries becomes impossible.
106. J. SIMPSON & H. Fox, supra note 87, at 117.
107. Id. at 118.
108. Id.
109. ICSID Convention, supra note 1, at art. 27(1) & (2).
110. Note, The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes: Investment
Arbitration for the 1990s, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON Dis. RES. 107, 113 (1988).
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In the countries that do not recognize Calvo clauses in their own con-
tracts, the Calvo clause contained in Article 27 of the Convention creates
no problem, and they are able to avail themselves of ICSID's attractive
benefits. Hence, the express inclusion of Article 27's Calvo clause in the
Convention, while presumably there to strengthen ICSID's dispute reso-
lution process, appears to have the indirect, but powerful, contrary effect
of restricting ICSID's membership to countries not recognizing Calvo
clauses.
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A review of ICSID's creation reveals that one of its primary purposes
is to encourage foreign investment in LDCs and NICs by providing a
neutral international forum for resolving any contractual disputes arising
from these investment ventures. Further review of ICSID's effectiveness
reveals that a significant segment of the countries, such as Latin Ameri-
can nations, that could benefit from foreign investment are not members
of ICSID and thereby receive none of the available benefits. This is IC-
SID's major drawback.
While several negative factors, such as the lack of enforcement of IC-
SID awards, may cause Latin American nations to shy away from IC-
SID membership, further inquiry reveals that a unique contributing fac-
tor is the recognition of the Calvo doctrine of law and the utilization of
Calvo clauses by Latin American countries. While ICSID's shortcomings
may be a deterrent to any nation joining its membership, a review of
Table 1'l illustrates that ICSID membership by non-Calvo doctrine
countries is widespread. Thus, the lack of ICSID membership by such a
large geographic segment of nations as Latin America must be attrib-
uted to an additional deterrent factor unique to those nonmember coun-
tries, such as the Calvo doctrine or Calvo clauses.
The Calvo clause requires aliens, in resolving contractual disputes, to
submit such disputes solely to local tribunals for resolution and to
thereby waive all rights to alternative remedies available to the alien
under international law. Following this concept, countries including
Calvo clause provisions in their contracts would not allow investment dis-
putes between foreign investors and host state governments to be re-
solved by ICSID's provisions. Hence, unless these countries abandon
Calvo clauses in their contracts, the likelihood of these countries becom-
ing ICSID signatories appears slight.
I II. Contracting States, supra note 34, at 14-15.
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A historical examination of the Calvo clause indicates that this legal
concept has a long tradition in Latin America since its recognition in the
late 1800's. Although few disputes have challenged the Calvo clause re-
cently and although international economics and human rights philoso-
phies have changed drastically since the Calvo doctrine was first devised,
it seems unlikely that Latin American countries will eliminate this legal
concept in the near future.
An ironic twist to this situation is the fact that ICSID itself, in Article
27 to its Convention, has a Calvo clause which requires that disputes
submitted to ICSID for resolution be resolved solely through the ICSID
process to the exclusion of all alternative remedies available to the par-
ties. While this provision was included to strengthen ICSID's jurisdic-
tion, it has the indirect effect of limiting ICSID membership to countries
not following the Calvo doctrine, a doctrine which ICSID itself champi-
ons enough to follow.
The failure of Latin American countries to join ICSID remains a
jroblem for ICSID and a disadvantage to these countries, which could
greatly benefit from the foreign investment encouraged by ICSID mem-
bership. The likelihood for increased membership by Latin American
countries would be enhanced if these countries were to abandon Calvo
clauses in their contracts. While a few countries have done so, an overall
trend in this direction appears unlikely. A second impediment to ICSID
membership by Latin American countries is the Calvo clause contained
in Article 27 of the Convention. Removal of this provision together with
abandonment of Calvo clauses by Latin American countries appears to
be the best resolution to this ICSID membership limitation.

